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THE DISPUTES CLAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT: ITS
MISCONSTRUCTION
HE Government of the United States has been and willT continue to be the largest, most extensive and prolific
client of the construction industry in this country. The tre-
mendous military expansion required for World War II saw
the erection of Army, Navy and Air Force installations of un-
precedented scope and geographic distribution. The post-
war era continued apace with the construction of mammoth
hospitals for veterans in mute valedictory to the carnage of
victory. The present period, which may well be a pre-war
era, brings further extension of national defense facilities,
construction of atomic energy installations and rehabilita-
tion of the sprawling posts, camps and stations of the past
war. This recent history of concentrated building on behalf
of the United States has brought with it a corresponding
flood of litigation which accentuates the importance of a
document undramatically entitled, U.S. Standard Form of
Contract No. 23, the legal instrument creating, defining and
describing the mutual rights and obligations of the contractor
and his Government in all of the varied construction opera-
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tions described.' Much of the litigation arising from the
performance of this gigantic program of construction involves
the interpretation of the various standard clauses found in
U. S. Standard Contract No. 23. With the tightening of
credit controls and the conservation and allocation of scarce
building materials, the contractor, small as well as large, is
more and more occupied with federal building programs. The
subcontractor (the plumber, the painter, the electrician, the
ironworker, the plasterer and lather, the mason and the
excavator) does not escape the requirements of the standard
Government construction contract, since it is usual to incor-
porate in the private subcontract a provision subjecting the
subcontractor to all of the terms, agreements and provisions
of the contract subsisting between the prime contractor and
the United States. It therefore behooves an ever-widening
segment of the bar to be familiar with the standard contract.2
This article will be limited to a discussion of the legal aspects
of one of the clauses, Article 15, the "disputes" provision,
found in this contract.
Perhaps most of the litigation involving the standard Gov-
ernment contract has been created by the very provision
which was designed to avoid it. The "disputes" clause usually
provides: 3
1 The United States Standard Form of Construction Contract No. 23 was
adopted and approved by the President in 1926 and revised in 1940. On the back
of the last page it is noted: "1. This form shall be used for every formal contract
for the construction of or repair of public buildings or works, but its use will not
be required in foreign countries. 2. There shall be no deviation from this standard
contract form, except as provided for in these directions, and except as authorized
by the Director of Procurement." See Pfotzer v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 390
(Ct. CI. 1948).
2 Thus, in United States ex rel. Gillioz v. John Kerns Const. Co., 50 F. Supp.
692 (E. D. Ark. 1943), the subcontractor's right to recover against the contractor
for delays was denied by reason of the finality of the contracting officer's decision
which was binding not only upon the contractor, but also on the relator whose
subcontract was expressly made subject to the main contract.
3 The "contracting officer" named in the contract is usually a professional
engineer regularly employed by the department of Government requesting the con-
struction. He might be the District Engineer, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, or
a corresponding official in the U. S. Air Force, Navy, or in a civilian department
of the Government. The head of department is, as the name implies, the adminis-
trative official in control, subject only to the President. Thus, the head of the de-
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Article 15-Disputes - Except as otherwise specifically
provided in this contract, all disputes concerning questions
of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the
contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor
within 30 days to the head of the department concerned or his
duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final
and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime the
contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as directed.
The object of the quoted article has been stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States as follows: 4
It creates a mechanism whereby adjustments may be made
and errors corrected on an administrative level, thereby per-
mitting the Government to mitigate or avoid large damage
claims that might otherwise be created.... This mechanism,
moreover, is exclusive in nature. Solely through its operation
may claims be made and adjudicated .as to matters arising
under the contract.
However laudable and refreshing the thought of saving Gov-
ernment funds may be, a study of the cases will reveal that
the failure of the Supreme Court to supply the "mechanism"
with the necessary lubrication of reasonable construction
and interpretation has resulted in a Frankenstein creation.
Retooling and replacement of parts appear to be in order.
At the outset it should be noted that this procedure set
up by Article 15 provides an exclusive avenue of relief. An
aggrieved contractor must exhaust the administrative pro-
cedure before he can litigate in the Court of Claims.5 He
must first protest to the contracting officer; 6 if redress is
partment might be the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Interior, etc. He may have
delegated his duties under this type contract to a "Board of Contract Appeals"
sitting in Washington, D.C. See the discussion of these boards in McWilliams
Dredging Co. v. United States, 118, Ct. Cl. 1, 16, 17 (1950).
4 United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U. S. 234, 239-40, 66 S. Ct. 1000, 90 L.
Ed. 1192 (1946).
5 Id., 328 U. S. at 240. The controlling statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (Supp.
1951), provides: "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States:
"(4) Founded upon any express or implied contract with the United
States."
6 Usually the contracting officer has representatives on the job-site, project
engineers, inspectors or. superintendents. Protest to the contracting officer is
usually required by the contract to be in writing. Oral protest, even though fol-
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not forthcoming, he must then appeal in writing within
thirty days to the head of the department concerned.' Fail-
ure to exhaust the administrative remedy is fatal to the
contractor.8 This rule has been adhered to by the Supreme
Court ' even though the conduct of the representative of the
contracting officer was so abusive and flagrantly unreason-
able that the contractor had concluded that protest and
appeal would be a waste of time. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Frankfurter characterized the conduct of the Govern-
ment engineers as "wilful and oppressive" and as a "syste-
matic practice of unjustified demands and vexations." 1o The
majority of the Court argued that it was not reasonable
for the contractor to assume that the same antisocial attitude
of the minor officials involved would pervade the entire
department to top levels. 1 The contractor had been suc-
cessful in the Court of Claims, urging inter alia, that as a
practical matter, appeals and protests would only further
antagonize the on-the-site representative of the Government
who resented any reflections upon his judgment and who
would further harass operations as the job continued.12
lowed by a written opinion of the Judge Advocate General favorable to the con-
tractor and approved by the Assistant Secretary of War, and unfruitful negotia-
tion were held insufficient to waive the requirement of the contract. Sanford &
Brooks Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 455, 45 S. Ct. 341, 69 L. Ed. 734 (1925);
accord, United States v. Cunningham, 125 F. (2d) 28 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
7 Upon appeal the contracting officer usually prepares findings of fact which
are forwarded to the contractor who responds by comment and brief. Failure to
serve the contractor with a copy of the findings has been held to nullify the
finality of the department head's decision and to permit the contractor to proceed
in the Court of Claims. Sachs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 59 (Ct. CI. 1945).
8 United States v. Callahan Walker Co., 317 U. S. 56, 63 S. Ct. 113. 87 L. Ed.
49 (1942).
9 United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U. S. 234, 66 S. Ct. 1000, 90 L. Ed. 1192
(1946) ; United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820, 88 L. Ed. 1039 (1944).
10 United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 740, 64 S. Ct. 820, 88 L. Ed. 1039
(1944).
11 Id., 321 U. S. at 736. The unreasonable conduct of a contracting officer,
who is "repellant" of appeal, as distinguished from similarly unreasonable conduct
of a contracting officers's underling, excused administrative appeal in United States
v. L. P. & J. A. Smith, 256 U. S. 11, 41 S. Ct. 413, 65 L. Ed. 808 (1921).
12 Blair v. United States, 99 Ct. C1. 71 (1942), rev'd, 321 U. S. 730, 64 S. Ct.
820, 88 L. Ed. 1039 (1944).
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An Avenue of Escape?,
At first blush it would seem that Article 15 does not com-
pletely shut the door to judicial review. As the clause in
question is quoted above, it appears that the jurisdiction of
the contracting officer and the department head are limited
to "questions of fact." The ready suggestion would be that
with respect to "questions of law," access to the Court of
Claims could be gained without resorting first to administra-
tive remedies. There is authority for this distinction and the
contractor has been afforded a judicial review without ap-
pealing to the department head where the dispute involved
a question of law rather than fact.'3 However, the contractor
must be wary and his attempt to avoid the administrative
toils may be thwarted.
First: In some cases Article 15 is not limited on its face
to questions of fact. There are cases where the article
provides that "all disputes arising under the contract" are to
be determined by the contracting officer subject to appeal
to the department head. The Court of Claims vigorously
challenged the validity of the "all disputes" clause: 11
But the competency of the parties to so stipulate, as the
courts have many times pointed out, is limited to the decision
of questions of fact arising under the contract, such as the
quantity and quality of materials delivered, whether the work
performed meets contract requirements, causes of delay in
the performance of the work, etc. These ,are questions of fact,
the correct solution of which is usually largely dependent on
professional knowledge and skill .... But the disputed question
here - whether the plaintiff under the terms of the contract
was required to furnish the materials demanded by the con-
tracting officer - was not one of fact. It was a disputed ques-
tion of law - the proper construction of the contract - a
13 See Western Well Drilling Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 377 (N. D.
Cal. 1951), where a contractor was permitted to sue under the Tucker Act, 28
U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2402 (Supp. 1951), even though he did not first appeal to
the department head, since the finding of the contracting officer that no "changed
condition," as defined by Article 4 of the contract, existed was a determination of
law and not of fact. Rust Engineering Co. v. United States, 86 Ct. C1. 461 (1938),
permitted the contractor to sue in the Court of Claims on a similar distinction.
14 Davis v. United States, 82 Ct. C1. 334, 346-7 (1936).
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question the decision of which was outside the jurisdiction of
the contracting officer or head of the department, it being the
province of the courts to declare the law of the contract.
Three years later, the Court of Claims in John McShain, Inc.
v. United States "5 reaffirmed this specific holding. The So-
licitor General petitioned for a writ of certiorari, urging that
the decision was the "culmination of a recent tendency in
the Court of Claims to whittle away the authority of desig-
nated officers of the United States to make final decisions
under contracts." 16 Certiorari was granted '" and the judg-
ment reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in a per curiam opinion.' In a later decision the Court
emphatically reaffirmed the validity of the "all disputes"
clause.' 9 With some reluctance 20 the Court of Claims has
followed the determination of the Supreme Court.
It would seem clear, therefore, that if Article 15 provides
for administrative jurisdiction of "all disputes," the con-
tractor must exhaust his remedy in the department before
proceeding to the Court of Claims.2 '
Second: Even if the disputes clause is limited to disputed
questions of fact, the contractor's attorney must still be
cautious. Article 15 commences with the language "except
as otherwise specifically provided in this contract ... ." Nor-
15 88 Ct. CI. 284, 297 (1939).
16 The petition is noted in United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457, 460, 70
S. Ct. 288, 94 L. Ed. 256 (1950).
17 United States v. John McShain, Inc., 307 U. S. 619, 59 S. Ct. 1043, 83 L.
Ed. 1499 (1939).
18 United States v. John McShain, Inc., 308 U. S. 512, 60 S. Ct. 134, 84 L. Ed.
437, order amended, 308 U. S. 520, 60 S. Ct. 134, 84 L. Ed. 437 (1939).
'9 United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457, 460-2, 70 S. Ct. 288, 94 L. Ed.
256 (1950).
20 George F. Driscoll Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 657 (Ct. C. 1945)
(Whitaker, J., and Madden, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 854, 66 S. Ct.
1340, 90 L. Ed. 1626 (1946).
21 The vast weight of authority supports the validity of clauses in contracts
appointing an impartial umpire as a final arbiter of all disputes arising under the
contract. See Notes, 54 A. L. R. 1255 (1928), 110 A. L. R. 137 (1937). Indiana is
contra. McCoy v. Able, 131 Ind. 417, 30 N. E. 528 (1892). There it was held that
such a provision was an improper attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction. The
arbitrator's finding was entitled only to prima facie validity and was not con-
clusive.
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
mally, Article 1 of the contract incorporates into the main
agreement the drawings and specifications. In these volu-
minous documents counsel for the contractor may find some
interesting language which precludes escape from adminis-
trative appeal and finality of the determination of the de-
partment head. In Pfotzer v. United States,2" the Court of
Claims was faced with a situation where the contractor and
the contracting officer had differed as to whether certain
work performed was included within the drawings and
specifications. The contractor urged that the decision of the
contracting officer and department head denying him extra
compensation was based upon an interpretation of the con-
tract and was therefore a question of law and not fact. The
Government relied on Paragraph 1-07 of the specifications
which provided: 23
Unless otherwise specifically set forth, the Contractor shall
furnish all materials, plant, supplies, equipment, labor, etc.,
necessary to complete the work according to the true intent
and meaning of the drawings and specifications, of which intent
and meaning the Contracting Officer shall be the interpreter.
Despite the incorporation by reference of the specifica-
tions, the Court of Claims held that where Article 15 men-
tions "this contract," it refers to the Standard Form 23 and
not the specifications; that Article 15 was paramount to the
specifications and that the quoted language of the specifica-
tions was only intended to keep the work progressing under
the.direction of the contracting officer and was not designed
to give him final authority with respect to an interpretation
of the contract, which was held to ,be a question of law and
not fact. The Supreme Court denied the Government's
petition for certiorari.24 The Court of Claims, in Moorman v.
United States,-5 was presented with a similar problem. The
contractor had agreed to grade the site of an aircraft assem-
22 77 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. C1. 1948).
23 Id. at 399.
24 United States v. Pfotzer, 335 U. S. 885, 69 S. Ct. 237, 93 L. Ed. 424 (1948).
25 82 F. Supp. 1010 (Ct. CL. 1949).
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bly plant at a unit price of 24 cents per cubic yard in strict
accordance with the drawings and specifications. A taxiway
was shown on the drawings but was not located within the
plant site as described in the specifications. A dispute arose
as to whether or not the contractor was required to grade
the taxiway and whether the unit price applied. Paragraph
2-16 of the specifications provided that if the contractor
objected to performing any work as not within the contract,
he must protest in writing to the contracting officer and, if
not satisfied, may appeal to the Secretary of War whose
decision would be "final and binding." There was the usual
Article 15 limiting administrative jurisdiction to questions
of fact. Following its decision in the Pfotzer case, the Court
of Claims held that Article 15, limited to fact questions, was
governing; that the specification section involved, properly
interpreted, only meant that such decision was final and
binding to the extent provided in Article 15 of the contract;
and that since under Article 15, only decisions upon disputed
questions of fact were final, the instant determination in-
volving a question of contract interpretation was one of law
and thus not conclusive upon the contractor. The Court of
Claims therefore made its own findings and permitted the
contractor to recover 59.3 cents per cubic yard for the taxi-
way grading instead of the 24 cent unit price provided in
the specifications. The Solicitor General again petitioned for
a writ of certiorari which was granted. 26 The petition urged
that this decision plus previous holdings of the 21
... Court of Claims had "weakened and narrowed the effec-
tiveness of the well-established policy of the Government to
settle, without expensive litigation, disputes arising under its
contracts."
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Claims in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black
26 United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 810, 70 S. Ct. 58, 94 L. Ed. 490 (1949).
2T The petition for certiorari is quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court
on the merits, United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457, 460, 70 S. Ct. 288, 94
L. Ed. 256 (1950).
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
which castigated the lower court with obvious relish.2" The
Court reaffirmed the legality of contractual provisions de-
signed to effect speedy settlement of all disputes, factual or
legal, at an administrative level. Whether the determination
at issue was one of fact or law, the contracting officer was
held to have jurisdiction and the determination of the de-
partment head was final under the specific language of Para-
graph 2-16 of the specifications, which was to be construed
with Article 15 and which was not nullified by it. The Court
pointed out: 29
The oft-repeated conclusion of the Court of Claims that
questions of "interpretation" are not questions of fact is am-
ple reason why the parties to the contract should provide for
final determination of such disputes by a method wholly
separate from the fact-limited provisions of Art. 15.
The staunch judicial blessing of the Supreme Court to
specification provisions conferring finality upon decisions
of the contracting officer (if affirmed by the department
head) in interpreting the requirements of the contract,
makes it mandatory for counsel representing the contractor
to read beyond the standard printed contract form to the
bewildering engineering and architectural data of the speci-
fications, if he is to advise his client properly as to his reme-
dies under the contract. The avenue of escape from appeal
to department head or from the finality of his decision may
well be a mirage.
How Final is Final?
Assume that an aggrieved contractor has appealed from
an adverse determination of the contracting officer whose
decision has been upheld by the department head. Assume
further that the dispute involves a question of fact within
the contracting officer's jurisdiction under the usual Article
15, or a question of law within his jurisdiction under the
judicially sanctioned "all disputes" Article 15 or under a
28 Id., 338 U. S. at 462-3.
29 Id., 338 U. S. at 463.
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special clause of the specifications. The vexatious question
arises: to what extent is his decision "final and conclusive"
as the contract literally provides?
The Supreme Court in 1854,30 in determining the conclu-
siveness to be accorded a commercial arbitration award pro-
vided for by contract, warned that a court of equity should
not set aside an award simply for error in judgment or to
substitute its judgment for that of the arbiter selected by
the parties. However, the Court pointed out that "corrup-
tion" or "gross mistake" "' on the part of the arbitrator
would warrant equitable intervention. In 1878 the Court, in
upholding the validity of the disputes clause, stated that the
findings of a contracting officer were final "in the absence of
fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad
faith. .... 2 The rule was restated in a later case which
held that such determination was final and conclusive "un-
less impeached on the ground of fraud, or such gross mistake
as necessarily implied bad faith." "
An even more complete exposition of the obligations of the
contracting officer is revealed in Ripley v. United States,34
decided by the Supreme Court in 1912. There, the contractor
claimed that he was prejudiced by the arbitrary refusal of
the contracting officer to permit blocks to be placed on a
jetty, which delayed the progress of the job. The Court
stated: 35
But the very extent of the power and the conclusive char-
acter of his decision raised a corresponding duty that the
agent's judgment should be exercised not capriciously or frau-
dulently, but reasonably, and with due regard to the rights
of both the contracting parties. The finding by the court that
the inspector's refusal was a gross mistake and an act of bad
30 Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 15 L. Ed. 96 (U. S. 1854).
31 Id., 15 L. Ed. at 99.
32 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398, 24 L. Ed. 1106, 1108 (1878).
33 Martinsburg & P. R.R. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 5 S. Ct. 1035, 1038, 29
L. Ed. 255 (1885).
34 223 U. S. 695, 32 S. Ct. 352, 56 L. Ed. 614 (1912).
35 Id., 32 S. Ct. at 355.
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faith necessarily, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the
contractor was entitled to recover the damages caused thereby.
In 1950 the Supreme Court, in the Moorman case,36 reit-
erated its position that either fraud or gross mistake would
lift the curtain of conclusiveness so as to permit judicial
scrutiny." In Penner Installation Corp. v. United States,"8
which was held in abeyance until the Supreme Court reached
a decision in the Moorman case, the Court of Claims re-
viewed its prior holdings on the question and concluded that
it was not bound by the determination of the contracting
officer on a question of fact, affirmed by the department
head, when the evidence disclosed that "The decisions of
the contracting officer and the head of the department...
were arbitrary and so grossly erroneous as to imply bad
faith." 11 The court had in the past formulated and continued
to announce the rule in substantially that language.4" The
rationale of this rule espoused by the Court of Claims had
its genesis in the language of the Ripley case "' referred to
above. The Court of Claims, after reviewing its prior rulings,
admitted in the Penner decision that the contracting officer
was properly in a unique, unenviable position. Although the
representative of the Government in the performance of the
36 United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457, 70 S. Ct. 288, 94 L. Ed. 256
(1950).
37 The Court, id., 338 U. S. at 461, cited with approval the language of the
Court in Martinsburg & P. R.R. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 5 S. Ct. 1035, 29 L. Ed.
255 (1885). See note 33 supra.
38 89 F. Supp. 545 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
39 Id. at 563.
40 See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp.
963, 965 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Loftis v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 816, 827 (Ct. CI.
1948); Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. CI. 535, 601-7 (1944); Bein v. United
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144, 166 (1943). But see Henry Ericsson Co. v. United States,
62 F. Supp. 312 (Ct. C. 1945), where the court found that the contracting officer
had ruled adversely to the contractor because he was "unaware" of the basis of
the claim. The court, id. at 327, saw "no point in applying words as 'arbitrary,'
'capricious,' or 'bad faith,' which are obviously inapplicable, in order to reach the
result which justice demands. We think that unawareness of the problem on the
part of the deciding officer is an equally good reason why his decision should lack
finality."
41 Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695, 32 S. Ct. 352, 56 L. Ed. 614 (1912).
See discussion in text at note 34 supra.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
contract and charged with the responsibility of insuring that
the Government receives precisely what it bargained for, he
must, in the event of a dispute, assume the capacity of an
impartial referee eager to do justice to the rights of both
contracting parties. And if the evidence discloses his failure
to act impartially, if there is no substantial basis upon which
his decision can be supported, ("arbitrary and capricious"
seem to be the judicial epithets characterizing this situation)
or when it is grossly erroneous, he has not been faithful to
his duty to act impartially, he is in bad faith and his deter-
mination is not conclusive. Bad faith, therefore, does not
imply that the contracting officer has been unfaithful to
his employer, but unfaithful to his duty as impartial arbiter.
The Court of Claims concluded that the contracting officer
had betrayed that trust in the Penner case and awarded
judgment to the contractor.42 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari,43 affirmed the judgment by an equally divided
Court 14 and finally denied a rehearing.45 One might conclude
that the law was rather well settled.
The Wunderlich Case
In Wunderlich v. United States,46 the Court of Claims was
again faced with the usual problems which have been dis-
cussed. The plaintiff had contracted to erect a dam in Colo-
rado in 1938. He performed certain work which was allegedly
beyond the contract requirements. A principal dispute in-
volved the amount recoverable for the maintenance and
repair of machinery and equipment. The contracting officer
fixed rates on an hourly basis which did not reflect any sub-
stantial variation in amount for equipment ranging from a
42 Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545, 548-50 (Ct. C.
1950).
43 United States v. Penner Installation Corp., 340 U. S. 808, 71 S. Ct. 55,
95 L. Ed. 594 (1950).
44 United States v. Penner Installation Corp., 340 U. S. 898, 71 S. Ct. 278,
95 L. Ed. 651 (1950).
45 340 U. S. 923, 71 S. Ct. 356, 95 L. Ed. 667 (1951).
46 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950).
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$207 jack hammer to a $39,000 drag line. This allowance
was termed "arbitrary" and "capricious" by the court which
permitted the contractor to recover some $172,000." Cer-
tiorari was granted by the Supreme Court 48 and judgment
was reversed in a 6-3 decision with a startling opinion by
Justice Minton.49 The opinion is startling not because it
reversed judgment for Wunderlich but because the rule it
announces has "wide application and a devastating effect." "o
The Court emasculated "gross mistake" from the exception
to administrative finality and announced that fraud was
the only exception to the conclusiveness of the determination
under Article 15. The Court defined fraud as "conscious
wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." "' The
Court further stated: "The decision of the department head,
absent fraudulent conduct, must stand under the plain
meaning of the contract." 52 The Court admitted that other
words such as negligence, incompetence, capriciousness and
arbitrary had appeared in the opinions but stated that "this
Court has consistently upheld the finality of the department
head's decision unless it was founded on fraud, alleged and
proved." " The Court suggested that the respondent was
not coerced, but had voluntarily entered the contract pro-
viding for the settlement of disputes in this manner. If the
standard of fraud proposed was too narrow, the Court sug-
gested that this was a matter for Congress to determine.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Douglas eloquently ex-
pressed his abhorrence at a rule which dispensed such un-
controlled discretion to a contracting officer who would be
immune from judicial intervention no matter how negligent,
47 Id. at 217-9.
48 United States v. Wunderlich, 341 U. S. 924, 71 S. Ct. 795, 95 L. Ed. 1356
(1951).
49 United States v. Wunderlich, ....U. S., 72 S. Ct. 154, 96 L. Ed. *67
(1951). Justices Douglas and Jackson each dissented in separate opinions. Justice
Reed concurred in the opinion of justice Douglas.
50 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 156.
51 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 155.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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capricious, stubborn or incompetent he might prove to be.
Justice Jackson, in a separate dissenting opinion, commented
unfavorably on the excision of gross mistake from the rule
to which the Court had previously subscribed. He observed
that "Men are more often bribed by their loyalties and
ambitions than by money." "
The holding of the majority opinion would seem not only
to be a departure from precedent, which was both unneces-
sary and unfortunate, but to be based upon specious reason-
ing. The argument that the plain meaning of the contract
requires that only fraud be excepted overlooks the fact that
neither "fraud" nor "mistake" is mentioned in Article 15.
Both exceptions have been engrafted by the judicial inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court in the line of decisions dis-
cussed above. The argument that the contractor voluntarily
entered the contract and therefore agreed to the arbitral
disposition overlooks the following points: (1) If the con-
tractor had consulted counsel with respect to the finality of
Article 15, he could hardly have had the good fortune to
retain a combination lawyer-prophet-seer who would have
been able to predict this departure from precedent. One of
the homely virtues of stare decisis is the reasonable expec-
tation of properly advising clients; (2) the argument fur-
ther overlooks the fact that the Government construction
contract is about as flexible as an insurance contract in so
far as its standard clauses are concerned.5" It is in reality a
contract of "adhesion." The contractor is in no position to
bargain as to its terms, to select an independent arbiter, or
to propose an entire elimination of the disputes clause. Even
if the courts do not go to the extremes of interpretation
found in the insurance cases, it should not be overlooked that
the Government prepared the instrument. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held:
54 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 157.
55 See note 1 supra.
56 United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U. S. 106, 65 S. Ct. 145, 89 L. Ed.
104 (1944).
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Although there will be exceptions, in general the United
States as a contractor must be treated as other contractors
under analogous situations. When problems of the interpreta-
tion of its contracts arise the law of contracts governs.
This judicial accolade upon unfettered discretion of the ar-
biter has little support in analogous situations in the law.5
(3) The argument finally overlooks a fact already adverted
to: the lack of availability of other civilian work of com-
parable size. Tightening of credit requirements and shortages
of materials constantly exert economic pressure upon the
contractor to undertake governmental work. Choice to sign
the contract. may simply be choice to remain in business.
Aftermath to Wunderlich
More important than its questionable legal basis, the
Wunderlich case presents grave practical and political diffi-
culties which Congress should remedy. The clash between
Court of Claims and Supreme Court has not been restricted
to the interpretation of Article 15 alone."5 The attitude of
the lower bench has been consistently responsive to the fact
that the contractor did not prepare and could not vary the
terms of the instrument. That court has implied constructive
conditions of good faith and co-operation on the part of the
Government.59 The Supreme Court has rarely acknowledged
these considerations, although in a dissenting opinion in the
Blair case,6" Justice Frankfurter observed rather elegantly
that"... government contracts have interstices that secrete
57 See, e.g., the architect certificate cases, RESTATEixT, CoNTRA(cTs § 303
(f) (1932), excusing the condition if the architect, surveyor or engineer is guilty
of gross error in regard to the facts on which the refusal to award the certificate
is based. See also 13 McQunziiT, MumciPAL CORPORATiONS § 37.155 (3d ed. 1950).
58 The courts have also differed in their interpretations of Articles 3, 4 and 9.
See United States v. Rice, 317 U. S. 61, 63 S. Ct. 120, 87 L. Ed. 53 (1942) (Articles
3 and 4 referring to changed conditions); United States v. Foley Co., 329 U. S.
64, 67 S. Ct. 154, 91 L. Ed. 44 (1946) (Article 9 referring to delays). The law
review comments were adverse to the rulings of -the Supreme Court: Anderson,
Damages for Delays in the Law of Government Contracts, 21 So. Ca.Lr. L. REv.
125 (1948); Coblens, Liability of the Owner for Delaying Contractor's Work -
The Foley Case, 21 So. CA=. L. REv. 36 (1947); 26 NEB. L. BULL. 457 (1947).
59 See, e.g., Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620, 623 (Ct. Ci. 1950).
60 United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820, 88 L. Ed. 1039 (1944).
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relevant implications." 61 The unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive conduct of the Government agents in that case
prompted the dissenting justice to agree with the Court of
Claims that appeal within the department involved was ex-
cused.
The Court of Claims has also been much more familiar
with and cognizant of the stresses and strains accompanying
the Government construction project and the relationship
between the contractor and the contracting officer. The con-
tracting officer is properly charged with the responsibility
of assuring the Government of the performance it has bar-
gained for. His presence personally or by representative, as
the job progresses, is indispensable. Left to his own devices
the contractor might attempt to disregard the stringent re-
quirements of Government contracts. When a question of
interpretation of drawings or specifications arises, it must
be his responsibility to make decisions and keep the work
progressing. No reasonable person could suggest otherwise.
The difficulty arises where a dispute occurs and he is re-
quired to temporarily forsake his role of Government repre-
sentative and act as impartial arbiter. It becomes extremely
difficult in practice to suddenly change character. It is
roughly comparable to suggesting that the attorney for the
defendant who has represented his client through the plead-
ings, motions and negotiations be now the judge of the
merits of the case on trial. The contracting officer, no matter
how well disposed, does not and cannot operate in a vacuum.
He can hardly help but be partial to the Government. More-
over, the actual performance of the work often engenders
an aura of mutual suspicion and distrust. The Government
representative may feel that the contractor's sole concern
is to make a profit at Government expense. On the other
hand, the contractor may consider him an unbending civil
61 Id., 321 '. S. at 738.
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servant enmeshed in reams of red tape, directives and chan-
nels of command which have deprived him of any independ-
ence or flexibility of action. Whether one or the other is
accurate in his appraisal or whether both are partially correct
is wholly immaterial. The undeniable fact is that the atmos-
phere exists in many cases.
The unfortunate Wunderlich decision takes no cognizance
of this reality. Incompetence, caprice, stubborn or unimagi-
native adherence to supposed duty are not proscribed; the
sole criterion is a conscious design to be dishonest or to cheat.
A striking example of the necessity of much broader judicial
review was revealed in Stafford v. United States.62 The con-
tractor had agreed to plant some ten thousand trees and
shrubs upon a Government project over an area 15 blocks
by 3 blocks. The contract provided for liquidated damages
in the event of delay beyond the specified time. There was
only one Government inspector on the job and he insisted
on personally supervising the planting of each tree and
shrub. He even demanded the uprooting of those which were
planted in his absence. The contractor's demand for more
inspections was refused. The contractor, "between the rock
and the whirlpool," 63 as the Court of Claims described it,
had no alternative but to work with a single crew. The court
permitted a recovery for the damages caused by this action.
However, the court emphasized that it had "no doubt" of
the inspector's sincerety.6" It is precisely this type of ar-
bitrary action which Wunderlich has placed beyond review.
Rare indeed will be the case where the contracting officer is
consciously attempting to defraud or cheat the contractor.
And rare will be the case where it could be proved. The
Wunderlich case teaches that fraud cannot be presumed. A
determination which could not be arrived at by reasonable
62 74 F. Supp. 155 (Ct. C1. 1947).
68 Id. at 162.
64 Ibid.
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men could be the product of incompetence or of an over-
developed, out-of-proportion sense of duty as well as the
result of fraud.
That appeal to department head is an unsatisfactory
method of curing improper action in lower echelons would
seem to be attested by reviewing the cases in the Court of
Claims. The reports and recommendations of subordinate
officials, acquiring age, bulk and respectability as they pro-
ceed to swim upstream to top levels through the mystifying
channels of Government departments, may well find accept-
ance at face value. The tendency to emphasize the solution
of factual and legal disputes within the limits of Govern-
ment agencies to the practical exclusion of courts of record,
is alarming. Traditionally a suitor is entitled to a "day in
court": this should be literally true, he should not be rele-
gated to administrative bureaus. The jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims has been seriously whittled down by these
decisions. It would seem entirely proper and just that Con-
gress revise and rewrite Article 15 so as to assure the con-
tractor a day in the Court of Claims if the action taken below
is "arbitrary, capricious or so grossly erroneous as to imply
bad faith." If the contracting officer and department head
are to be placed in the incongruous position of impartial
arbiter, then their jurisdiction should not extend to the
determination of questions of contract law. Presumably the
Court of Claims is a more competent forum for the settle-
ment of legal disputes if the system of "checks and balances"
is to be maintained.
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